looks at the question of whether the dependency approach can now in fact be pronounced dead. It consists partly of articles evaluating either the approach in general or the work of particular theorists, and partly of articles considering the implications of the experience and prospects of five reasonably successful peripheral economiesIran, Costa Rica. South Korea, Singapore and Ireland.
There is some dispute about the origins of the school. In the popularised version two principal currents are general/v cited. ECLA (the UN Economic Commission for Latin America) and the Marxian and neo-Marxian North Americans (Baran, Sweezv and Frank) . It is added, at times. that the dependent islas.......esent different ideological standings. according to their proximili' to ECLA (and to the peur-bourgeois nationalismS which is supposed to hare derived from the ECLA studies) or to their more authentic opposition to capitalism, and hence their proximiti' to the thought of the Marxian economists referred to above.
ICardoso 1977:21
Cardoso justifiably objects to this version. which gives inadequate weight to the longstanding tradition of Marxian thought in Latin America, to internal political debates within Latin Amthcan countriesand particularly within their Communist partieson the role to be played by the national bourgeoisie, and to the influence of the Cuban revolution.
However, although the importance of ECLA in the development of dependency thinking may tend to be exaggerated, there is no denying that its economists Bulletin, 1980, vol were important in this respect in their prescription of disengagement from the international capitalist systemat least to the extent of planned. capitalist, import-substituting industrialisation behind a tariff or quota wall.
Parts of their theory survive more or less intact among dependency and underdevelopment theorists. For instance, the Emmanuel/Amin theory of unequal exchange could be regarded as a restatement in Marxist language of the Prebisch/Singer/Lewis analysis of the differing effects of productivity increases at centre and periphery arising from the differing degrees of competition in their product and labour markets. But, in common with other development economists and unlike the later dependency school, ECLA operated with a Harrod/Domar type of planning model and therefore looked favourably on foreign investment and aid as a means of easing the capital constraint. As well as adding to the capacity to import capital goods, foreign capital was seen as helping the balance of payments, reducing inflationary pressures and transferring technology.
Even Nurkse envisaged a role for foreign capital. although he was one of the few early development economists to anticipate the dependency emphasis on problems arising from non-trade contacts between central and peripheral countries. He pointed to the international demonstration effect arising from the spread of knowledge in underdeveloped countries of the consumption standards of rich countries. Drawing a parallel with Duesenberrys work on the interdependence of individual consumption functions. Nurkse suggested that 'the presence or the mere knowledge of new goods and new methods of consumption tends to raise the general propensity to consumeS and that ihe temptation to copy American consumption patterns tends to limit the supply of investible funds by inhibiting the willingness to save. There is an obvious affinity here with the later emphasis on consumption patterns of. say, Sunkel or Furtado. but there is a difference. Nurkse was still operating within a Harrod/Doirar framework and thus emphasising the demonstration effect only on the rate of saving and hence on the rate of growth. He recognised that disengagement from the international economy was logically implied by his analysis but regarded this as a 'defeatist solution', preferring to try to raise the rate of saving by a compulsory saving scheme, backed up by foreign investment and aid. lt is not, perhaps, surprising that the development economists who seem to get closest to the dependency position are those who question the Harrod/Domar emphasis on capital as the sole constraint and emphasise rather the inadequacy of the inducement to invest. For example, Myrdal (whose 'circular-causation' challenge to equilibrium economics is an unacknowledged influence on dependency and 'uneven development' theory) drew attention to the fact that the need for capital in underdeveloped countries does not represent an effective demand in the capital market. Rather, if there were no exchange controls and if, at the sjne time, there were no elements in their national development policies securing high profits for capitalie if the forces in the capital market were given unhampered playcapitalists in underdeveloped countries would be exporting capital. and regards it as a 'dead end', with no possibility of transition to a 'self-centred' system based on production of mass-consumption and capital goods. He sees self-
The question was never perhaps directly addressed at this level of generality by the dependentistas. Much of their work was geographically localised and historically circumscribed, but this is the general question implicit in that work.
reliance, therefore, as a necessary strategy for transition to socialism. to perform a Marxian industrial-reserve-army role. This is a profoundly pessimistic. even catastrophic, vision, not only questioning the employment-generating performance of peripheral capitalism, but also denying its capacity to perform a historically progressive role.
The Caribbean dependency school (reviewed by Pantin below) is on the whole less pessimistic about the possibilities of capitalist development, as long as the plantation economy model is replaced by a localised or 'people's capitalisme A notable exception is Thomas 119741, who points to the way in which colonialism led to a separation of the pattern and growth of domestic resource use from the pattern and growth of domestic demand: and to divergence between domestic demand and the needs of the broad mass of the population.
Even in the case of the most successful small capitalist economies at the periphery, he sees no real possibility of development 'beyond misleading rises in per capita income or indeed of even sustaining such advances on a long-term basis. . . unless a comprehensive socialist strategy is developed' I Thomas 1974: 106 J. He recognises, however, in 'some of the larger economies the possibility of indigenous capitalist development of productive forces as a genuine alternative to socialism.
Perhaps the most complex member of the dependency school, so critical in his more recent writing of most of its conclusions as almost to place himself outside it, is Dependency thinking has hardly been useful so far in explaining its emergence as a newly industrialising country. but in a modified form such thinking is seen as likely to throw up interesting questions about the Korean case.
The conclusion, then, of the articles here would seem to be that the 'straw man' of stagnationist dependencia is certainly dead; but that the questions raised by the dependenuistas are still important; and that a start has been made in modifying the approach in a direction that would enable such cases as South Korea to be predicted rather than treated as ad hoc and special. However, there is a long way to go before such a theory of the articulation of external and internal variables in determining limits on capitalist development is successfully developed.
note: for references, see bibliography at the end of this
